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# Comparing dispatching heuristics in harbour protection problems using an agent-based simulator

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# ΜΟΤΤΟ

Doing more with less

or, at least,

Doing better with the same

Improve on effectiveness with same or fewer resources, by considering smarter TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures)



# SECUREPORT


An elaborate agent-based simulator, for fine assessment of harbour protection plans:

- (expeditionary) logistics
- layers of protection and areas of responsibility
- sensor locations
- TTP for mobile platforms


also taking into account:

- geodata, spatial constraints, LoS constraints
- realistic surface maritime traffic + divers
- probabilistic sensor models
- METOC conditions (emulation of real-world passage of time)

## **SECUREPORT: A SAMPLE SCENARIO**



## **SECUREPORT: SIMULATION PHASE**




# SECUREPORT: GLOBAL MoMs

#### 10 LOGISTIC ASPECTS •Operation costs, with full relation of equipments and personnel •Foot print, in square meters, required for accommodation and operation and volume and weight to be transported. Required budget (m€) TACTICAL ASPECTS List of selected sensors and their locations. •Patrol boats and land teams schedule (RD) •Patrol boat quantity, real time rules of dispatching and surveillance equipment., observation and reaction posts. •Patrol areas design. SUCCESS ASPECTS •Risk, measured in terms of terrorist probability of success (successful terrorist attacks/attempted terrorist attacks). Successful terrorist routes, times and tactics (expected and worst case). ADVERSARIAL ASPECTS •Range of adversarial variables considered in the solution (density of attacks, terrorist behaviors and typology. 0

# **Risk of terrorist success**

Each solution characterized by:

# THE DESIGN SPACE OF CONDITIONS AND SOLUTIONS



# OUTLINE

- SecurePort: an elaborate agent-based simulator
- Smart routing of mobile units
- A "thin" simulator of tactics
- Experiments on dispatching heuristics
- Conclusion

# TASK-DRIVEN DYNAMIC ROUTING OF MOBILE UNITS


#### **APPLICATIONS** in security or safety:

- Emergency vehicles
- UAV (e.g., A.I.Barros @ NATO OR&A Conf 2014)
- **Patrol boats** (e.g., NATO DAT-PoW Item 2, HP)
- •••

#### DIFFICULTIES:

- Combinatorial in nature
- Highly dynamic and stochastic scenarios
- Uncertainty of adversarial behaviours
- Uncertainty in detection and tracking ability
- Time and spatial constraints
- ...

# JOB SEQUENCE FOR EACH PATROL BOAT



# Description

Undefined duration. Could perform a random walk inside allocated area if associated with a sensor.

Application of rules to choose target. Duration dependent of initial positions, courses and speeds, target behaviour.

Associated with the loss of contact. Duration dependent of the initial contact nature (sea life, false contact, diver)

Boarding process. Duration dependent of target behaviour.

Detain process. Duration dependent of legal aspects.

Return to initial area or position, at best speed.

# TTP IN WATERSIDE CLASSIFICATION TASKS

• Prioritization:

Which pending task to do next?

#### Dispatching:

Which resource for which task?

#### • Interception plan:

Which course and speed?

#### • Continuous prediction:

What is the estimated point of interception?

• Continuous reassessment of engagement:


Is there currently a more prioritary task?

• **Repositioning/loitering/searching:** What to do if no tasks pending?


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# A "THIN" SIMULATOR OF TACTICS



# **ARRIVAL PROCESS**: WHEN, WHERE, WHAT ?



STAND-BY LOCI AXIS

**CRITICAL AREA** 

# PERFORMANCE

By decreasing order of "disutility":

- not preventing successful attacks
- not intercepting all contacts
- costs (no. of resources, fuel usage)

#### Main factors:

- the "geometry" of the area of operations (incl. critical areas)
- the relation between "offer" and "demand"
- the degree of uncertainty in adversarial behaviours
- the degrees of awareness and agility

# **PRIORITY RULES**

#### A priority rule is based on one or more attributes, as an evaluation function:

At time *t*, choose as next contact to intercept, for classification, the one with **smallest** value of  $f_i(t)$ 

#### An example:

$$f_i(t) = \frac{slack_i(t)}{weight_i(t)}$$

"**Priority** = Importance x Urgency"

**Importance** = estimated/perceived danger

**Urgency** = scarcity of spare time to accomplish task (\*)

(\*) taking into account estimates of: "travel time", "processing time" and "deadline"

# **PRIORITY RULES +**


#### Further examples:

 $f_{i}(t) = \min_{\mathbf{z} \mid Z(t)} \left\| \mathbf{X}_{i}(t) - \mathbf{z} \right\|$ 

Choose the unclassified contact, positioned at  $\mathbf{x}_{i}(t)$ , that is "**closer**" (taking speeds into account) to some set of points, Z(t) e.g.

- Z = positions of idle resources (smaller travel time)
- Z = HVUs or other critical areas (\*)
- Z = the border of the area of operations (\*)


(\*) conditional to interception in time still possible





# OUTLINE


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# **SAMPLE RESULTS FROM A SIMPLE HEURISTIC RULE**











# **AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN**

- 15 dispatching rules evaluated
- 5x5x5 experimental scenarios, each one defined by a combination of 3 factors:
  - "Lambda": avg interarrival time of new contacts to the AO; levels: {2, 6, 10, 14, 18}
  - "Boats": number of patrol boats used; levels: {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}
  - "Speeds": ratio between speed of patrol boats and avg speed of maritime traffic; levels: {1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.9}
- MoM: % of contacts that reached the critical area without being classified (and cleared)

# RULE ID 1: Target priority: "First in" (= FCFS) Boat priority: closest to target Interception mode: "1st order" (= head to current target position)






closest to patrol boat

shortest estimated interception time

"2nd order" (= head to estimated interception position)



Number of	
notrol hooto	

1

76.7

73.5

69.7

66.5

64.7

62.5

57.0

7

6

6

6

6

7

51.5

42.6

33.6

24.9

20.7

29.5

14 2

7

7

8

7

7

8

2		6		10	)	14	ł	18	3
92.1	7	83.1	7	76.3	7	70.1	7	65.0	7
90.9	6	79.7	7	70.6	7	64.0	7	58.2	7
89.7	6	76.3	7	65.6	7	57.2	7	48.3	7
88.8	6	73.5	7	61.9	7	51.7	7	42.4	7
88.1	6	70.9	7	58.1	7	46.3	7	37.3	7

36.8

21.6

11.6

6.6

3.4

13.1

27

7

7

8

8

7

8

24.1

10.2

3.2

1.5

0.6

5.0

04

7

10

10

10

2

7

12

10

10

17.2

5.4

1.5

0.2

0.0

2.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

10 7

8

13

10

10

ID

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

closest to boat

first out

first out

first out

first out

first out

lambda

Only one rule reached this performance Rule ID is shown

Several rules reached this performance

Rules

_	

9

57.0	-	17.2	U	2.1	U	0.4
50.8	6	4.2	7	0.5	7	0.0
46.1	6	2.3	7	0.0	12	0.0
42.4	6	1.0	7	0.0		0.0
49.6	7	15.9	8	3.6	10	1.2
41.2	7	2.4	7	0.3	3	0.0
33.3	7	0.2	7	0.0	13	0.0
26.9	6	0.0		0.0		0.0
22.5	8	0.0		0.0		0.0
38.6	7	6.7	7	1.2	5	0.5

38.6 <b>7</b>	6.7 <b>7</b>	1.2 <mark>5</mark>	0.5 <b>10</b>	0.5
27.8 <mark>8</mark>	0.4 8	0.0	0.0	0.0
17.1 <mark>8</mark>	0.0 15	0.0	0.0	0.0
10.2 7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
6.9 <mark>6</mark>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

			Score
first in	closest to target	1st order	16
first in	closest to target	2nd order	32
first in	shortest interception time	2nd order	32
first in	closest to critical area	1st order	14
first in	closest to critical area	2nd order	27
closest to boat	closest to target	1st order	30
closest to boat	closest to target	2nd order	76
closest to boat	shortest interception time	2nd order	61
closest to boat	closest to critical area	1st order	18

Score: No. times the rule was best (in 125 scenarios)

closest to critical area

closest to target

closest to target

shortest interception time

closest to critical area

closest to critical area

57

17

32

33

13

31

2nd order

1st order

2nd order

2nd order

1st order

2nd order

# **DECISION SUPPORT**

Given adversarial conditions, such as:

- maritime traffic density
- average traffic speed

and given **budgetary constraints**:

- number of patrol boats
- ... which rule to apply, and at what cost?

E.g., for lambda = 10, and speed factor = 1.5,
 "0% risk" would be attained with 7 boats and by using Rule ID 13


# **OPERATIONAL COSTS**

• The daily operational cost for a projected force is derived from the number of patrol boats to be used:

Boats	Personnel	Weigth (ton)	Volume(m3)	Total daily cost (€)	
1	62	45	590	5405	
3	92	53	922	8343	
5	120	62	1255	11176	
7	151	73	1627	14283	
9	180	84	1992	17299	

 These costs are precisely estimated by a separate tool, where all logistics aspects are taken into account through an atomized evaluation process

## **DECISION SUPPORT TOOL**



# **STRATEGIC & TACTICAL DECISIONS**

- The Decision-maker is provided a decision support tool to explore the knowledge base of experimental results
- In general, he/she is able to promptly estimate the effect of any alternative solution on the measures of merit given assumptions on adversarial variables

(no. of resources; tactics)(financial costs; expected mission success)(traffic density; traffic avg speed; ...)

- Under a given budget, he/she may then decide upon:
  - the number of patrol boats to include in a mission, according to the expected worse case traffic conditions;
  - the number of patrol boats to engage and the tactics to employ along time, according to the current traffic conditions

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# CONCLUSION

In summary:

- heuristics are not only convenient but necessary
- **priority** may be driven by many (dynamic) task attributes
- the **thin simulator** enables an intensive/extensive experimentation
- the elaborate simulator enables a realistic assessment
- **decision support** at all levels: strategic, operational, tactical

#### Way ahead:

...

- comprehensive comparison of many heuristics; combination
- POR Navy responsibilities and activities wrt NATO DAT-PoW
- SCI-280 RTG: SoS approach for task driven sensor resource mgmt for MSA
- possible adaptation to UAV dynamic mission planning

# Questions / suggestions welcome

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